Journal of Colonel Samuel J. Atlee, commanding a Pennsylvania battalion.
August 27, 1776

I then received orders from Lord Stirling to advance with my battalion and oppose the enemy's passing a morass or swamp at the foot of a fine rising ground, upon which they were first discovered, and thereby give time to our brigade to form upon the heights. This order I immediately obeyed, notwithstanding we must be exposed, without any kind of cover, to the great fire of the enemy's musketry and field pieces, charged with round and grape shot, and finely situated upon the eminence above mentioned, having the entire command of the ground I was ordered to occupy. My battalion, although new and never before having the opportunity of facing an enemy, sustained their fire until the brigade had formed; but finding we could not possibly prevent their crossing the swamp, I ordered my detachment to file off to the left I, and take post in a wood upon the left of the brigade. Here I looked upon my self advantageously situated and might be enabled, upon the advance of the enemy, to give him a warm reception. In this affair I lost but one soldier, shot with a grape shot through his throat. I had not taken post in the above mentioned wood but a few minutes when I received a reinforcement of two companies of the Delawares, under Captain Stedman, with orders from Lord Stirling to file off further to the left and prevent, if possible, a body of the enemy observed advancing to flank the brigade.

The enemy's troops by this time had passed the swamp and formed in line of battle opposite ours. A heavy fire, as well from small arms as artillery, ensued, with very little damage on our side; what the enemy sustained we could not judge. Upon filing off to the left, according to the orders I had received, I espied at the distance of about three hundred yards a hill of clear ground, which I judged to be a proper situation to oppose the troops ordered to flank us, and which I determined, if possible, to gain before them. At the foot of this hill a few of Huntington's Connecticut Regiment, that had been upon the picket, joined me. In order to gain and secure the hill, I ordered the troops to wheel to the right and march up the hill abreast. When within about forty yards of the summit, we very unexpectedly received a very heavy fire from the enemy taken post there before us, notwithstanding the forced march I made.

The enemy's situation was so very advantageous, the back of the hill where they had taken post being formed by nature into a breast-work, that, had they directed their fire properly or been marksmen, they must have cut off the greatest part of my detachment, I having, before I advanced [up] the hill, posted a part of my small number along the skirt of a wood upon my right, and left a guard at the foot of the hill to prevent my being surrounded and my retreat to the brigade in case of necessity being cut off, the enemy being vastly superior in numbers, their detachment consisting of the Twenty-Third and Forty-Fourth Regiments and part of the Seventeenth.

Upon receiving the above heavy fire, which continued very warm and they secure behind the hill, a small halt was made, and the detachment fell back a few paces. Here Capt. Stedman, with all the Delawares except the Lieutenants Stewart and Harney with about sixteen privates, left me and drew after them some of my own. The remainder, after recovering a little from this, their first shock, I ordered to advance, at the same time desiring them to preserve their fire and aim aright. They immediately, with the resolution of veteran soldiers, obeyed the order. The enemy, finding their opponents fast advancing and determined to dispute the ground with them, fled with precipitation, leaving behind them twelve killed upon the spot and a lieutenant I and four privates wounded. In this engagement I lost my worthy friend and Lieutenant-Colonel (Parry) shot through the head, who fell without a groan, fighting in defense of his much injured country. In the midst of the action I ordered four soldiers to carry him as speedily as possible within the lines at Brookline....

I fully expected, as did most of my officers, that the strength of the British army was advancing in this quarter to our lines. But how greatly were we deceived when intelligence was received by some scattering soldiers that the right vying and centre of the army, amongst which were the Hessians were advancing to surround us. This we were soon convinced of by an exceeding heavy fire in our rear. No troops having been posted to oppose the march of this grand body of the enemy's army but Colonel Miles's two battalions of rifles, Colonel Willis's battalion of Connecticut, and a part of Lutz and Kiechlien's battalions of the Pennsylvania Flying Camp, I once more sent my adjutant to Lord Stirling, to acquaint him with the last success obtained by my party, and to request his further orders; but receiving no answer, the adjutant not returning, and waiting near three quarters of an hour for the enemy, they not approaching in front but those in the rear drawing near, I thought it most prudent to join the brigade, where I might be of more advantage than in my present situation....

How great was my surprise I leave any one to judge when, upon coming to the ground occupied by our troops, to find it evacuated and the troops gone off without my receiving the least intelligence of the movement or order what to do, although I had so shortly before sent my adjutant to the general for that purpose. The general must have known, by my continuing in my post at the hill, I must, with all my party, inevitably fall a sacrifice to the enemy. An opportunity yet afforded, with risking the lives of some of us, of getting off. But perceiving a body of the enemy advancing, which proved to be the English Grenadiers, under Lieutenant Colonel Monckton, to fall upon the rear of our brigade, which I could see at a distance, I ordered my party once more to advance and support a few brave fellows, endeavoring to prevent, but I without success, the destruction of their countrymen. The timely assistance of a number often tried, and as often victorious, encouraged those already engaged and obliged the enemy to quit the ground they had gained and retire to a fence lined with trees. Here we kept up a close fire, until the brigade had retreated out of our sight, when, not being able, through the weakness of my party already greatly fatigued and once more destitute of ammunition, to break through the enemy, and finding my retreat after the brigade cut off, I filed off to the right, to endeavour, if possible, to escape through that quarter. .

After marching about half a mile to the right, I fell in with General Parsons and a small number by him collected. In consultation with the general it was determined to break through the enemy, who were here within a little way of us, and endeavour to make up the island. I then pushed off, with such of the officers and soldiers that were willing to run this hazard. What became of General Parsons I know not, never having seen him since....

I imagined that if I could cross the Flatbush road, I could then make my escape by Hell-Gate, but coming to the road found it everywhere strictly guarded. After trying the road in several places, both to the right and left, and finding no passage, we retired to an eminence about sixty perches from the road, to consult whether best to conceal ourselves in the adjacent swamps or divide into small parties, when we espied a party of Hessians who had discovered and were endeavouring to surround us. The opinion we had formed of these troops determined us to run any risk rather than fall into their hands; and finding after all our struggles no prospect of escaping, we determined to throw ourselves into the mercy of a battalion of Highlanders posted upon an eminence near the Flatbush road, not far from where we had last j sat. This we did about five o'clock in the afternoon to the number of twenty-three, thereby escaping the pursuit of a party of Hessians who came to the Highlanders immediately after our surrender....

Thus ended this most unfortunate 27th of August, 1776, during which myself and my detachment underwent great fatigue and escaped death in a variety of instances. And I am happy to reflect that during the whole of this perilous day, one and all, to the utmost of their powers and abilities, exerted themselves in performing their several duties, for which I shall ever retain a grateful sense, and do, for and in behalf of my country, return to them my sincere acknowledgments, as I flatter myself, under-God, they were the means of twice preserving the brigade from being cut to pieces: first it preventing the troops in which Grant bore a command from falling upon the left flank; and lastly, in so bravely attacking the Grenadiers, where Monckton commanded, and thereby preventing the destruction of the rear. In the first Grant fell, in the latter was Monckton wounded.